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managemat practices  to improve  the design and
govenace  of public pensions  in developing  * Fiscal stress reduced  stock funding  ratios.
countries.  Understanding  this relationship  is
important  because  better yields  on public  pen-  * Stock funding  rates  were  lower, the higher
sion plan investments  reduce  the need for  the fraction  of elected  retirees  and elected  active
additional  taxes  to support  retirees  - and well-  workers  represented  on the pension systemn
funded  plans stand  a better chance of paying  board.
promised  benefits.
S*  tock  funding  raldos were  higher  when a
Her model  relates  investnent  returns  on  system  had  in-house  actuaries,  when the  board
public  pension  assets,  as well  as plan  funding  authorized  benefit  levels,  and  when  board
status,  to features  characterizing  the pension  members  had  liability  insurance.
systems'  governance  structure  and  authority,
using  a new data set on U.S.  state  and local  *  Stock  funding  rates  were unaltered  by state
public  sector  plans.  Certain  findings  stand out:  statutes  guaranteering  that  benefits  be guaranteed
by law, or by legally  set funding  requirements,  or
The higher  the fraction  of retirees  elected  to  by the state's  ability  to carry  budget  deficits  from
the  pension  board,  the stronger  the negative  one  year to the  next. Nor did tiiey vary  when
effect  on investment  return  in 1990,  and the  dedicated  or special  taxes  were  earmarked  for
more  variable  the  returns.  pension  revenue.
* Systems  fared about  the  same whether  they  Policymakers  in developing  countries  can
had  in-house  or extemal  money  managers,  or  profit  from  the mistakes  made  and lessons
independent  performance  analysis  (even  if the  learned  by U.S. pension  analysts.  although  no
extemal  managers  were  drawn  from the  "top  single package  of pension  plan  practices  can
10"). But  public  pensions  perforned  better  when  optimize  investment  performance  for all systems
fund  and  actuarial  computations  were  done  by  across  all time  periods,  care must  be taken  when
professional  actuarial  and investment  couselors  designing  the regulatory  and investment  environ-
rather  than  relying  on former  or current  employ-  ment  in which  these  plans  operate.  Developing
ees to choose  investment  strategies.  countries  should  study the  work of the  U.S.
Government  Accounting  Standards  Board.
* Social  investment  rules  hurt  public  pension
yields.  Public  pension  plans  which  mandated  that  Mitchell  discusses  some  of  the complex
a certain  portion  of investments  be directcr  to in-  issues  that  i.ust  be confronted  when establishing
state  projects  generated  much  lower  returns.  funding  norms  for defined  benefit  pension  plans
in the public  sector.
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Olivia  S. Mitchell  - Public Pension Governance and ?erformancePublic Sector Pension Governance and Performance:
Lessons for Developing Countries
Olivia S. Mvitchell
The cost of supporting retirees has risen quickly in both developed  and
developing nations, and promises to become ever greater in decades to come.  Policymakers
seek to prepare for these costs by designing better functioning pension plan structures. One
item or. the policy agenda is to improve pension plan investment and funding  performance.
This paper examines public sector pension plans in the United States, asking why some
plans appear to have been well-managed,  and what structural design features are associated
with good pension management  outcomes.  A new data set on more thau 200 state and
local public sector plans in the U.S. indicates that many of these pensions experience decent
investment performance, and some are relatively well-funded.  Offsetting  these successful
plans is the experience of other pension systems who report poor investment  performance
and underfunding difficulties. Our analysis examines the relationship between public sector
plan performance and management  practices, seeking to draw lessons which might improve
the design and governance of public pensions in developing countries.
The two pension plan performance outcome measures of central interest in
this paper are the yields on public pension system assets, and the public pension  plans'
funding status.  Investment performance is important since higher yie!ds reduce the need for
additional taxes to support current and future retirees.  Pension funding is important since
better funded plans stand a better chance of having assets on hand to pay promised benefits.
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This study relates these two pension plan outcomes to a variety of features characterizing
each pension system's govemance structure and authority, reporting requirements,  and other
factors affecting the environment in which the pension funds operate.
Section I of the paper develops a series of hypotheses regarding public
pension plans'  investment performance, linking pension governance, while Section TI
axamines determinants of funding patterns.  Empirical analysis in Section III suggests that
investnent performance in 1990 was reduced by having a heavy representation  of elected
retirees serving on the public pension Board, and by mandates that a specified portiLn of
pension assets be earmarked for in-state projects.  Systems fared about the same irrespective
of whether they had in-house or extemal money managers, or independent  performance
enalysts.  The empirical aialysis also shows that fiscal stress was found to systematically
and powerfully reduce pension funding, as did having a large representation  of elected
retirees and active workers on the pension system Board.  Pension funding was higher when
the system employed in-house actuaries, when the Board was required to authorize benefit
levels,  and when Board members had liability insurance.  Section IV evaluates  these results
in light of slightly different empirical specifications. Finally, Section V draws lessons from
this research for policymakers in developing countries, in the hope that they may benefit
from the experience of public pension plans in the United States.
I. The  Determ..jants  of Public Pension Investment  Performance
Often  referred to  as "public employee retirement  systems" (PERS),
retirement  systems  established  for individuals  employed  by state and local governments
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have become large and powerful institutio-is in the last three decades. Typically these are
defined benefit pension plans, which provide workers an annual benefit accrual (usually a
function of pay and years of service). This accrual converts into a retirement  annuity
payment when the employee  attains a specified age and service under the plan.  Recent
surveys (see Table 1) show that there are approximately 2,400 public pension systems in
the U.S., coveting about 10 million full-time public sector employees  and about 3 million
pension beneficiaries -- mainly employees of state and local  'overnments,  and often
teachers and other school employees, police and firefighters,  judges, correctional officers,
and other public servants.'  These plans pay relatively generous benefit levels, amounting
to some 40% of pre-retirement  pay at relatively young retirement ages; usually PERS
retirement benefits are at least partially indexed to inrlation.
Benefit promises which accrue under PERS plans are liabilities  that the
sponsor is expected to pay retirees at some future date.  Practice varies as to whether public
employers back up these promises by making payments to a segregated  pension trust fund,
which are then invested to generate eventual benefit payments.  Many PERS plans have
succeeded in amassing substantial  funds:  in the U.S., public pensions held about $730
billion at the end of the 1980's, accounting for 5% of the country's total financial assets,
13% of all domestic bonds, and almost 8% of all domestic equities (Hoffman and Mondejar
1992).
A major responsibility  of those charged with managing public sector pensions
is to direct the inves  .nent of these assets.  Research suggests that PERS funds have been
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managed somewhat differently  from thos  in private sector pensions. Thus Table 2
indicates tnat until 1960, corporate equities -2yistituted  only a negligible fraction of state
and local plan assets, while government securities and corporate bonds were much more
heavily favored than private plans.  This pattern of asset holdings was in part motivated by
state and loe"al  government  rules prohibiting pension managers from investing in what were
perceived to be "risky" assets including equity, venture capital, and foreign  holdings.
Though these strictures have been curtailed ocr  the last decade, yields on
public pension fund assets have frequently been low, with puv!ic plans earning rates of
return substantially below those of other pooled funds, and of:en below leading market
indices. 2 Table 3 demonstrates  this for the eighteen year perio  i  1968-86,  and the pattern
persists in more recent statistics.  More recently, state and local pension plans reported
annual returns averaging 11.13%,  during a time when bonds rose by 15.5%  and securities
by 13.9% (Table 4).
One explanation  for why public plan investment yields are often low is that
they are operated according to principles different from those adopted in the private sector.
Specifically, many public pensions are managed by staff which must respond to political as
well as economic incentives  and pressures.  A typical public system is governed by a Board
of Directors comprised of eight members, on average, with three elected members, three
appointed members (often by the Governor), and two serving ex officio  (e.g. the State
Treasurer, the superintendent  of schools, etc).  Those elected to public pension Boards are
frequently active employees,  which is quite uncomrnon in the private sector;  in addition, in
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many cases retired workers are also included as Board members (Zorn 1991).
Because pubiic pension Boards are mi-naged by political appointees  and
covered pension members, it is at least plausible that they may select investments different
from those chosen by private-sector  professionals cL.  npeting in the capital market. There is
little direct evidence on this point in the public sector, but in the private sector, pension
participants appear to invest more conservatively than do profess  onal pension managers
(EBRI 1993).  Hence it is hypothesized that better performance from public pensions could
be observed when public systems manage their funds professionally, instead of rclylng on
fonner or current employees.
Another way that pension governance structures might alter PERS investment
yields is due to the fact that Board authority varies a great deal across public pension plans,
depending on laws which vary from state to state, and also deperding on custom and
tradition (Zorn 199i).  For example, some PERS Boards have a great deal of responsibility
for investment decisions, the- control actuarial inflation and interest rate assumptions, and
direct the system's reporting practices.  In other cases, external professional money
managers and actuaries manage investments and reporting, leaving day-to-day benefit
payments and record-keeping functions to the Board.  The latter tasks are substantial: public
sector pension plans reported an average of 42,000 active members per plan and $2.8
billion in assets, with annual administrative  costs totalling about 1-4% of assets. 3 Large
plans can service many of these needs in-house, employing on the average one staff
member per 1,000 plan participants.  Smaller plans are more likely to use external actuarial,
Olivia S. Mitchell - Public Pension Govemance and Performancelegal, and accounting firms, and frequently employ professional  money manar,ers and/or
investment consultants  as well  (Zorn 1991).
When  re  sector pension systems manage their benefits administration and
investmnent  in-house, researchers have found substantial evidence of economies of scale in
larger plans (Mitchell  and Andrews 1981). It is therefore reasonable to expect that larger
gubli pension plans might also experience higher yields, and perhaps less variability in
yields, than would smaller plans.  It is, of course, possible that small plans could capture
most of these scale economies by hiring external professional noney managers and
consultants. For this reason, it would be important to determine whether investment returns
vary with having outside money managers.  Furthermore, some private sector money
managers are more successful than others, as discussed by Lakonishok  et al (1992).  Thus
investment management  firrns in the Top 10 performance group tend to do relatively well
as investors; as others have pointed out, however, the Top 10 group is costly to empl  3y,
and might not produce higher net returns (after subtracting commissions). Hence it may be
hypothesized that public plan performance will depend positively on plan size if scale
economies prevail (conditional  on managing the money in-house),  and may be higher if
outside managers (especia'ly Top 10 performers) can generate higher net returns conditional
on plan size.
Offsetting  the hypothesis that external investment advice might result in
higher and less variable pension asset yields, is the recent finding that net investment
returns are sometimes lower when investment managers are subjected to frequent
Olivia S. Mitchell - Public Pension Governance and Performance7
performance reviews.  This is because of a principal/agent problem: money managers
appear to altez their portfolios in ways which systemPatically  mak: them look better over the
short run, but which in the long run prove costly for the fund. 4 Applying  the argument to
the PERS sector, it might be predicted that systems using extcrnal money managers and
who employ frequent valuations  might experience lower net rates r f retu-n than would
systems using only in-house  managers, 'articularly  if they are evaluated  relatively
infrequently (ceteris paribus). Thus  in empirical analysis of pension asset yields it wil' be
important to control not only on who is inanaging the portfolio, but also on how often tl  y
report how they are doing.
Pension plan asset performance clearsy depends on other factors in addition to
the ones just described, with perhaps the most important one being the fund's portfolio mix.
As noted earlier, public plans tend to hold fewer stocks than do private pensions, in part
because the federal government  requires private pension fiduciaries to invest in a
well-diversified portfolio of assets chosen for traditional financial reasons. Furthermnore,
ERISA regulations governing  private plans specifically require pension fiduciaries  to behave
according to generally accepted financial principl-;, a philosophy summarized  as the
"prudent man rule".  In the public pension arena, no federal legislation controls FERS
investment patterns. As a result, there are no legal constraints on those who wish to dtploy
public pension assets for nontraditionai  investment purposes, and several groups have
become increasingly voca.5 For example, the Governor of New York argues that public
pension assets be loaned advantageously  to firms "conducting business"  within his state.
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Other  states have asked their pension  tfid  managers  to only invest  in so-called  "socially
responsible"  companies  (defined  variously as firms who avoid investments  in South Africa,
f;rms which  do not pollute,  etc).  While these unconventional  investment practices have
their appcea.!,  retirees and active workers have expressed  concern  that their pension assets
rmay  eam  low returns,  and perhaps  be insufficiently  diversified  (New York State Industrial
Cooperation  Council  1989 and  1990; New  York Retired  Public Employees  Association
1989; Snell and  Wolfe 1990).
These  differences  in  PLRS investment practices  imply that public pension
plan returns  may vary  because of strictures placed  on the plans by the political process,
strictures  which  may not be in evidence  in privately-run  pension plans.  As a result,
empirical  analysis  of PERS performance  should take into acLount whether investors  operate
under constraints  wbich might inc'  Je ceilings  on the fraction  of assets in bonds or stocks,
rules  requiring  fiduciaries to diversify their portfolios  in a manner which might be deemed
"prudent"  by impartial  financial experts, and requirements  that money must be directed to
"socially  acceptable"  ventures.  If these strictures  are effective,  they may lower returns, and
possibly  increase  risk.
II.  The Determinants  of Public Sector Pension  Funding  Practices
U.S.  law requi-es private employers  to explicitly  recognize their accumulating
pension  liabilities, and then set aside contributions  in an orderly fashion so as to build up
assets  sufficient  to meet benefit  promises  when workers retire.  The rationale for full
pension  funding  in the private  sector is that  sponsoring companies  may go bankrupt, and
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unless the pension plan has received assets sufficient to cover benefit promises, retirees
could face curtailed or terminated benefit payments. 6
In the public sector, pension funding practice has been much more variable,
both in the U.S. and elsewhere. This is partly because many deem the risk of government
bankruptcy to be low, and thus less persuasive as a rationale for prefunding. As a result,
partially funded or completely  unfunded (pay-as-you-go or PAYGO) plans have been the
norm for most O.E.C.D.  nations (James 1992).  At the state level in the U.S., funding
practices also vary:  in some cases, state laws do require prefunding for accumulating
pension liabilities, but in other cases they do not.  (For con3titutional  reasons, the Federal
government has not regulated  state-level public pensions).
Despite the PAYGO tradition, there are many arguments  favoring substantial
pension prefunding in the public sector.  Funds invested earn the pension  plan investment
income, which "can substantially  reduce +he  employer's ultimate  payment for such benefits"
(Bleakney 1972: 16) -- a particularly inmportant  matter in view of the aging of the public
sector workforce over the next two decades (Mitchell 1991). Also, underfunded  pensions
impose an implicit future liability on taxpayers, reducing the ability of states and localities
to raise funds in other -.ays (Epple and Schipper 1981). In addition, public sector retirees'
income security can also be reduced by underfunding; indeed some public employees have
sought offset the risk of underfunded  pension promises by demanding  higher pay (Smith
1981; Mitchell and Smith 1992b). Some have also contended that PAYGO systems
decrease savings and impose politically unpalatable rsdistributive  burdens across coho.'ts
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(James 1992).
Despite thee arguments favoring prefunding of benefit promises,  public sector
pension plans have typically accumulated fewer assets relative to benefits, than have their
private sector counterparts  (Table 5).  In the  1980's, many public employers  contributed
less to their public employees' pension accounts than they were required to according to
actuarial computations. This is in part due to shortfalls in tax revenue collected by
American states and cities during the last recession, leading some public employers  to fall
behind on their pension contribution  schedules.  Many public pensions  are therefore
underfunded, meaning that plan assets are insufficient to cover benefits promised to retirees.
A study of 1989 data showed  that state and local employer pension conaibutions were
about 10-15% below target, and the pattern of shortfall was most persistent for systems
where unemployment was higher than it had been for some time. This effect persisted even
when controlling for habit persistence, holding constant past cumulative  funding levels
(Mitchell and Smith 1992 a and b).  Therefore a full analysis of funding  must take into
account the possibility that fiscal stress undermines PERS plans' fiaiancial  stability.
Previous research suggests several reasons that the structure  of PERS Boards
might have an effect on pension fundi..g.  One consideration is that a Board composed of
political appointees may feel differently about funding requirements  than would a Board
heavily weighted with pension-covered  elected members.  As an example of this, consider
the court case recently filed by Califomia state retirees against Govemor Pete Wilson.
State budget deficits at the end of the 1980s drove the Govemor to propose raising the
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public pension plan's assumed interest rate from 8.5% to 9.5%, a position opposed by
retirees who argued that "...manipulating the rate of return on plan investments,  though
within legally 'reasonable limits', can substantially reduce employer contributions  to the
point where a pension plan can be substantially underfunded  and put at high risk."
(Hemmerick 1991b:  39).  When the partly-elected PERS Board refused to implement it, he
then moved to dissolve it and construct a Board more conducive  to his needs.  Hence it is
should be determined  whether Board composition has a potent effect on pension funding
patterns, with the expectation that plan participants, particularly  retirees, might be expected
to exert a positive influence on funding (other things equal).
Working counter to this hypothesis is the fact that pension funding is an
extremely complex and difficult area, which elected workers and retirees may be unable to
fully scrutinize. Their lack of adequate technical training is exacerbated  by the fact that
data are difficult to obtain, and figures depend a great deal on underlying assumptions used
to evaluate future benefit obligations as well as assets on hand.  While little research in the
funding area has been conducted, studies have shown that covered pension participants
typically have very poor understanding of thei- pension plan's rules and features (Mitchell
1988) For this reason, having professional representatives  on the PERS Board  could
improve funding, especially  as compared to relatively nontechnical  pension participants.
Which effect dominates  is an empirical matter.
In addition to Board composition, other PERS management  practices can also
influence funding outcomes directly.  Specifically, some systems use in-house staff
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actuaries, increasing funding  if these staffers are relatively rree from political suasion, but
decreasing it otherwise.  When the PERS Board is required to authorize benefit increases,
rather than simply passing on increases negotiated by state and local employees
independently, this could translate into higher funding rates -- after all, authorization to
provide future benefits would be required from those managing thn funding process.  It is
also worth investigating  whether funding is improved when Board members have liability  .
insurance, which if true suggests that the private insurance market may enforce funding
stringencies on PERS Boards when political tensions pull in other directions.
Another set of factors influencing funding may be the reporting requirements
to which pension managers  respond.  While public pension accounting practice embraces
some common assumptions  and standards across states and localities, the remaining
differences make it difficult to compare public plan investment  performance  and funding
outcomes in some cases. This problem has been recognized by many pension analysts over
the years, and is slowly being remedied by the Governmental  Accounting  Standards Board
which is devising a framework for public pension financial reporting (GASB 1992). The
majority of large state and local plans now conform to GASB Statement  No. 5 (GASB
1986) which specifies  that public pension plans must report assets at market value, and
liabilities measured according to a concept known as the Pension Benefit Obligation
(PBO).'  As a result of this increasing standardization, it is now much more likely that
stock funding ratios are accurate, by which is meant that pension assets are correctly
computed as a fraction of liabilities.  This contrasts with practice a decade ago when most
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PERS plans  reported  assets at cost, and used a  variety of different  methods to compute
liability  measures  (Schmitt et al. 1991).  Despite this progress,  a cross-plan analysis of
funding  still  requires paying attention  to different  approaches  used in reporting assets and
funding.
Along  the same lines, it might  be expected  that more frequent reporting
would tend to induce  standardization,  so that better  funding  would be expected of a PERS
required  to  report to its sponsoring employer  and participating  members more often.  Audits
and actuarial  valuations  are also  carried out at different  intervals, and the reporting
standards  themselves  vary.  These different  reporting  methods  may simply affect data
quality  without altering  investment and funding  performance,  but many fear they have more
potent effects  altering plan outcomes materially.  These cross-plan  differences  should be
controlled  in empirical  analysis, and examined to  see if they influence PERS funding
outcomes  materially.
Other  variations in pension reporting  are also  important, particularly  in the
case where  flow funding measures  are considered.  For the purpose  of this discussion, flow
funding  is defined as the ratio of annual actual employer  contributions,  to annual required
contributions.  Variations  in flow funding measures  are partly  due to laws governing
pension  funding  practices which differ across states.  As  an example, the fire and police
pension  plans  in Portland, Oregon, obey  a law  which sets  the public employer's  annual
contribution  rates as a fraction of payroll, and this contribution  rate is generally met.
C1ziseque.itly the pension  financial statement  indicates that the employer's  actual
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contributions  are exactly equal to required contributions, resulting in a flow funding rate of
100%. In fact, however, the system has virtually no assets since it is operated on a
PAYGO basis.'  Therefore the flow funding figure reported by this plan does not represent
the actuarial figures that the accounting standards profession would prefer under its
proposed reporting rules.  A related problem arising in the reporting context arises when a
system uses the PBO measure to report GASB-sanctioned  funding measures, but uses some
other actuarial method to compute annual required employer contributions.  It is possible
that a plan would then appear well funded by the officially recommended  PBO measure,
but would be less than fully funded by the system's own accounting measure. This has
apparently occurred in several instances over the last two years, where employers were able
to dramatically cut their contributions  after converting to new actuarial methods consistent
with the PBO measure. 9As a consequence, it is important to investigate whether differences
in funding patterns are related to different methods of computing liabilities for reporting,
versus funding, purposes.
Funding differences may also result from other factors.  In computing
pension obligations, for instance, actuaries employ a variety of assumptions  to compute
promised future benefits. Unbiased estimates of the factors of central interest require that
these assumptions be controlled in the empirical analysis, by including plan-specific
estimates of expected future price and wage increases, assumed discount rates and
retirement ages, integration of benefits with Social Security, whether benefit levels were
guaranteed by law, and portability of pension accruals.  Pension systems also have some
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leeway with regard to their past service liability amortization period, which refers to the
time period over which unfunded pension promises from the past are covered from current
contributions.  Since it is possible that poorly funded plans strategically  select an
amortization period to improve the funding report, this too should be controlled  on in a
multivariate funding analysis.
To this list of pension funding determinants must be joined several indicators
of the regulatory and fiscal environment in which PERS Board members make funding
decisions. Most obviously linked the pension funding outcome is the existence  of state-level
legally mandated funding  requirements. One would anticipate that if such law is binding, it
would enhance funding  in those states.  A variant of this point is that states experiencing
severe fiscal stress tend to reduce funding, suggesting that this too should be taken into
account in multivariate  analysis.  Based on previous work, we include a variable indicating
fiscal stress, which is the deviation of the state's unemployment  rate from its long term
trend (Mitchell and Smith 1992a). It is anticipated that greater fiscal stress would reduce
funding, perhaps offset if contributions  are derived from a special or dedicated  tax.  In
addition other "political  economy variables" are explored including  an indicator of whether
a state has a balanced budget requirement, to assess whether pension  underfunding serves as
a "safety valve" in cases where the balanced budget rule is taken seriously.  Finally, there
may be differences in plan participants' ability to exact full funding rates, so it is important
to control for the presence  of unionized employees and teachers.
HII.  Empirical  Analysis of Public Pension  Yields and  Funding
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The data used for empirical analysis are obtained from a cross sectional
survey of 201 pension systems conducted in 1991, covering a total of 269 separate
retirement plans.  The PENDAT file created from this survey was provided by the
Government Finance Officers' Association (Zom 1991). As of this writing,  there  s no
larger, more up-to-date, and more representative survey of state and local pension plans in
the country; the federal government collects no centralized information  of this type (though
many have suggested it should). Respondent systems in..iuded in the PENDAT file
represented 73% of state and local active pension plan participants, and 71% of state and
local plm assets in 1990 (Zom 1991). These systems represent the vast majority of the
PERS-covered population, but are not necessarily representative of all plans since they are
among the largest in the nation, and probably better managed and funded than many smaller
plans; as a consequence,  interpretation  of results must bear this caveat in mind. PERS plans
responding to the survey accounted for about a tenth of the estimated universe of state and
local pension plans nationally.
The PENDAT datafile is quite extensive, including variables  reflecting all
aspects of the systems' management, investment, and funding practices as well as plan
participant and benefit mixes.'°  Two indicators of investment performance  are used as
dependent variables for the multivariate  analysis -- the actual investment  yield rates, and the
variability  of plans'  investment yields -- and two measures  of pension funding -- stock and
flow funding patterns.
Taking the investment outcomes first, three different ways were chosen to
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measure public system's asset performance.  Virtually all PERS report one datum for 1990
-- that year's total portfolio return (referred to as YIROR), and most also reported their
annualized average return over the period 1986-199U  (referred to as Y5ROR).  Both
variables are reported in nominal dollars (the analysis therefore assumes that all plans
experienced identical inflation rates). The fact that the investment yield is a- eraged over the
5-year span makes it impossible to compute traditional measures of pension performance
variability over time, so precise estimates of this concept must await development of panel
data. An alternative variability measure used here is the root of the squared deviation
beitween  YIROR and YSROR as a fraction of Y5ROR, defined here as RETURNSD.
Two dependent variables were developed for the funding analysis.  The
concept which best captures a plan's  stock funding rate in the PENDAT survey expresses
pension plan assets as a fraction of the Pension Benefit Obligation, and for ease of
reference this stock funding measure is termed AST_PBO. An alternative measure focuses
on the plan's current funding practices, a concept captured here as FLONVFUND,  or the
ratio of actual to required employer contributions  for the year.
Explanatory  variables in the analysis are grouped into five main categories:
pension Board composition,  Board management practices, investment practices, reporting
requirements and assumptions,  and other factors which reflect regulations at the state level
governing budget and funding practices.  Controls are also included for plan size, type of
plan and covered employees,  and in some cases portfolio composition is incorporated on the
grounds that plans with less risky holdings will have lower returns.
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Most of these variables were directly derived from the PENDAT file, but
outside sources were used in a few instances.  The variable called TOPIOMG  indicates
whether the pension system used a money manager in the Top 10 performance  group as
identified by Lakonishok  et al (1992).  The term UNEMPD represents  the degree of fiscal
stress experienced by the state proxied by the deviation of the unemployment  rate in 1990
from the mean of the previous nine years;  previous analysts suggest that this type of fiscal
stress reduces funding possibilities (Mitchell and Smith 1992b). The variable DEFPOS is
also derived from outside sources, and indicates whether a state is permitted to carry over a
budget deficit frem one year to the next.  Public pension funding may be seen as an
off-budget safety-valve,  relieving the pressure of having to meet state balanced budget
requirements.  Hence pensions  may be better funded when state budget  deficits can be
carried through time, while underfunding may prevail more often when state budgets must
be balanced, by law, at year's end."
Summarizing  this discussion in a multivariate framework,  the following
model is postulated:
(l)Y,  = a, + a, X, +  a 2 X 2 +  a 3 X 3 +  a, X4 +  a, Z +  e,
(2) Y 2 =  b, + b, X, + b, X2 + b 3 X3 + b 4 X4 + b5 Z + e 2
where Y,  represents a vector of variables reflecting public pension investment
performance: Y,represents a vector of funding variables; X, - X,represent vectors of
variables reflecting pension  Board composition, Board management  practices,  investment
practices, reporting requirements  and assumptions; and Z represents  a vector of other
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factors including state regulations governing budget and funding practices, controls for plan
size, type and in some cases portfolio composition. In this section the disturbance  terms are
assumed to be distributed normally with zero mean; in Section IV this assumption  and
others, are discussed in more detail.
Evidence on the Investment Performance  of State and Local Pension Systems
In 1990, the annual investment yield reported by the 168 PERS systems was
7.74% (Table 6).  This compares favorably with market data showing a +6.8% return for
securities that year, and with the 1990 inflation rate of 6.1%.  However, not all plans
performed this well -- one plan reported a -5.5% return that year, while at the other extreme
a plan reported  a yield of +24.5%. 12
This range (see Figure 1) is almost certainly due to different portfolio
composition patterns across the plans; in the market as a whole, the +6.8% return for
securities that year was offset by an average -3.2% yield on bonds, which suggests the
importance of holding constant the portfolio composition of pension plans when comparing
their investment yields.  A narrower frequency distribution of pension yields characterizes
YR5ROR, returns averaged ove; the period 1986-1990 (see Figure 2).  Across the 128
plans reporting the figure averaged 11.58%, with the lowest return reported of -2.54% and
the highest being 31%.'3 The overall mean was lower than the annualized return on bonds
for the same period of 13.5%, but exceeded the average stock return of 10.1%  as well as
the annualized inflation rate of 3.3%. The pattern of RETURNSD is sketched  in Figure 3:
this variable increases when there was a larger gap between the 1990 one-year  return and
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the average return over the 5-year period.  Put differently, since most investment yields
were low in 1990 as conmpared  to previous years, the plans with a higher value of
RETURNSD were those whose 1990 return fell most quickly, relatively speaking.
Table 7 provides multivariate linear regression estimates of equation (1)
above, indicating the determinants of pension plan investment yields.  The findings show
that the composition of the public pension Board appears to matter:  specifically, lower
yields in 1990 were tied to greater retiree representation on the public pension Boards.
This is probably not due to  more conservative investment choices made by retirees, since
the model controls for the portion of the portfolio held in stocks and bonds.  It may be the
result of inexpert retiree Board members becoming increasingly  activist of late, an
explanation buttressed by the fact that the retiree effect was negative but not statistically
significant in the five-year yield equation.  Another troubling finding is that pension
systems with more retirees on the Boards also experienced larger return variability between
1986 and 1990, suggesting that the lower yields in retiree-managed  plans were apparently
not offset by less risky assets.  Before concluding that state governments should move to
prohibit retiree participation on pension Boards, it should be noted that appointed members
might also reduce asset yields (if improperly selected). Future surveys should focus
attention on the new 1990's-brand of pension Board activism and its negative effect on
pension plan yields.
Of the several pension management practice variables used in the investment
performance equations, few had a powerful effect on pension yields or variability. One
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influential practice which did make a difference was a system's practice of permitting
administrative costs to be charged to investment incol ie (ADINVST),  rather than being
covered from state or local budgets directly. This reduced the 5-year average return figure
at statistically significant  levels, though neither the 1990 return nor the variability  measure
were powerfully affected. The PENDAT survey does not indicate whether  the systems
reported net or gross investment  returns, but tne negative significant effect of ADINVST
suggests that the figures given were net of expenses..
This surmise  is strengthened by the resultq of the next three management
practice variables reported in Table 7.  Many pension systems managed at least some of
their pension investments  in-house, but this p.actice apparently had no substantive  effect on
any of the investment yield outcomes.  Some state and local systems used outside money
managers and financial counsellors,  either in concert with internal management,  or
exclusively.  In al.' cases, the results indicated that plans investing in-house, or using
external money managers  fared about the same, even if the external managers  were drawn
from the "Top 10" group identified by Lakonishok et al. (1992).  This is not surprising if
the investment yield figures  supplied in the PENDAT survey were net returns, since higher
gross yields produced by active money managers tend to be equalized after commissions
(Ippolito 1989).
Only a few of the rules regarding investment practices proved statistically
significant in Table 7.  In no case was the prudent man requirement statistically  linked to
returns or investment variability,  though it may be that all pension Boards follow some
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variant of this policy 'which would explain why no significant effect was discerned). The
data also showed no si  ,nificant effect of state-mandated limits on stockholdings  on any of
the three investment performance variables.  More serious is the powerful negative return
observed in pension systems which were required to direct a fraction of their investments
in-state.  This policy has grown iinereasingly  popular in the last few years among those who
propose to use pension funds to build a stronger job and tax base.' 4 Unfortunately,  there
is emerging evidence that  such a poicy  was associated with lower investment  returns in
1990 -- by 7 to 8 percentage jsoints. This  ffect was not detected using the 1985-90
average return, but since it reflect.,  recent trends which may not have been in effect in
earlier years, the effect is large eiiough that it should not be ignored.
Two factors were used to quantify state and local pension system reporting
practices in the analysis presented in Table 7; numerous other variables were examined but
none proved especially significant.  It will be recalled that having independent  investment
performance analysts and more frequent performance valuations could be predicted  to either
improve or depress investment yields, depending on whether more reporting is seen as
beneficial, or harnful (Lakonishok  et al 1992; Benartzi and Thaler 1992). The data do not
support either position, however, since neither variable was strongly statistically  significant.
Summarizing  the findings, the empirical models examined indicate that some
pension governance and management factors systematically affected yields and variability,
at least for the sanple of plans considered here.  Three findings stand out:
(1) The frac'ion of retirees elected to the pension Board had a strong negative effect
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on investment  return in  1990, and increased return variability.
(2) Systems fared about the same irrespective of whether they had in-house, or
external money managers, or independent performance analysis (even if the external
managers were drawn from the "Top 10" group).
(3) Social investment  rules hurt public pension yields;  specifically,  public pension
plans which mandated that a certain portion of investments  be directed to in-state
projects generated  much lower returns.
Funding Patterns Among State and Local Pension Plans:
As noted earlier, many state and local pension plans follow GASB advisory
rules when reporting their pension assets and liabi!ities. This makes it possible to place
some credence in funding figures, particularly with regard to the ratio of the pension plan's
assets to its promised  benefit liabilities (AST_PBO).  As indicated in Figure 4, the stock
funding ratio averaged 91% in 1990 (for the 220 plans reporting). There is ample evidence
of wide dispersion in funding  practice:  the minimum stock funding ratio was
approximately 0 (for PAYGO plans), and 18 plans were seriously underfunded,  having less
than half the assets needed  to meet pension obligations.  "  On the other hand, the
maximum funding ratio was 3.2, and or.e-third of the plans had sufficient assets to meet
projected benefits. For this reason the average stock funding rates of more than 90%
should not be taken as evidence that public plans were uniformly well-funded  on an
accumulated basis.
Annual funding measures capture whether the employer is contributing
enough each year enough to cover new benefit accruals and amortization  needs from past
unfunded obligations. As mentioned earlier, however, there are serious reasons to believe
the FLOWFUIND  figures are biased upward; an employer reporting full compliance with
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required contribution levels may sometimes receive monies inadequate to meet eventual
benefit promises.  This probably explains why the average  FLOWFUND  ratio in  1990 was
93%  (across 187 plans; see Figure 5).  The range about the mean is large: at one extreme
a plan reported receiving  3.4 times the amount required, while at the other extreme a plan
indicated receiving -4.3 times what was required.6 On the whole, the vast majority (137
of 187) reported receiving contributions less than 100% of required, suggesting  that most
public sector employers' contributions  do not meet required levels. This is troubling,
particularly because of the concem that the FLOWFUND variable is biased upward.
Multivariate evidence linking public pension governance  and funding patterns
according to equation (2) is summarized in Table 8, where both stock and funding pattems
are examined.  A first hypothesis was that public pension Board composition variables are
related to stock funding  ratios, and there is support for this position. Specifically,  the
results show that having more elected members on the Board lowered pension funding
rates, with elected retirees having a particularly depressing effect.'"  No composition
effect was found in the flow funding equation, however.
Pension management  practice also proved informative  in explaining funding
patterns:  three of the four variables used were positively related to stock funding patterns.
For instance, the plans appeared better funded when a PERS had in-house actuaries, and the
effect was statistically significant. Likewise, if the Board was required to authorize benefit
levels, stock and flow funding were higher.  There was a positive significant  relationship
between funding levels and Board members having liability insurance:  perhaps this is due
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to the increased oversight imposed by private insurers. (On the other hand, flow funding
was negatively related to liability coverage -- which may indicate reverse causality, if plans
which underfunded on a flow basis were required to purchase insurance in order to induce
Board members to serve.)
Pension reporting and assumptions also affected funding outcomes as
expected.  Pension systems differed according to the frequency and format of funding
reports, and stock funding ratios were lower where longer amortization periods were
selected -- indeed, it is possible that amortization periods were strategically  chosen to
improve the funding report.  Supporting this view is the finding that plans which did not
report their amortization  period were even more seriously underfunded than average.
Clearly it is necessary to standardize on reporting in order to obtain a clear picture of stock
funding practices. Assumptions to compute promised future benefits also played a role in
the empirical analysis:  the model included variables indicating expected future price and
wage increases, assumed discount rates and retirement ages, integration of benefits with
Social Security, and portability of pension accruals.  Of this set, only the portability factor
proved statistically significant at conventional levels, and was negative. This is probably
due to the fact that asset accruals did not always follow employees who were permitted to
take benefit accruals with them when they changed jobs (usually this is limited to in-state
moves).  As such, it would be incorrect to conclude that labor mobility per  se reduces stock
funding ratios; rather, funding was low when systems permitted mobile workers to claim
benefits with no concomitant asset accumulation backing up the promise.
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Of the other factors controlled in the empirical funding analysis, very few
had potent effects.  Somewhat surprising was the null effect of state requirements that
pension plans had to be funded, requir-nents  that benefit levels had to be guaranteed by
law, and requirements that states must balance their budgets from one year to the next.  Nor
were funding levels different when dedicated or special taxes were earmarked for pension
revenue. 8 Employee type (i.e. teachers) and unionization status also had no effect.  In
fact, only one other variable was found to systematically  and powerfully reduce stock
funding: namely, fiscal stress, measured here by the deviation of recent unemployment  from
the levels experienced over the last decade.  The effect was substantial, suggesting that a 1
percentage point increase in a state's unemployment rate over the long run average would
cut stock funding by 6 percentage points.  It appears that economic recessions have long as
well as short term effects on public budgets through pension plan funding. This effect is
consistent with previous studies on public plans (Mitchell and Smith 1992a).
In summary,  there is reason to believe that the stock funding figures are of
superior quality than the flow funding data, so it is appropriate to emphasize those models
and findings.  In this dataset, pension underfunding patterns are explained by several factors
pertinent to the environment  in which the pension Board operated. The most important
findings were:
(1)  Fiscal stress reduced stock funding ratios.
(2)  Stock funding rates were lower, the higher the fraction of elected retirees and
elected active workers represented on the pension system Board.
(3)  Stock funding ratios were higher when the system had in-house actuaries, when
the Board was required to authorize benefit levels,  and when Board members had
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liability insurance.
(4)  Stock funding rates were unaltered by state statutes guaranteeing  that benefits
were guaranteed by law, or by legally set funding requirements,  or by the ability of
states to carry budget deficits from one year to the next.  They also did not vary
when dedicated or special taxes were earmarked for pension revenue.
IV. Sensitivity of Results
Several sensitivity tests were conducted to judge the robustness of the results. One concern
has to do with potential endogeneity  of particular variables in the Z vector. For example,
both the yield and variability  equations included in the Z vector the PERS portfolio mix,
because the plan's stock and bond holdings were expected to have affected the plan's
investment performance. On the other hand, the system's  1990 return and 1990 portfolio
mix were probably simultaneously  determined in a complex structural system involving
expectations over variables not available in the data set.  As a test of the model, the
potentially endogenous portfolio composition variables were purged and the model
reestimated, which produced estimates virtually identical to those reported in Table 7
(results available on request).  In a similar vein, it might be asserted that the pension
assumptions in equation (2) were endogenously determined by politicians setting funding
targets.  Hence a reduced-form  equation was estimated which excluded pension  assumptions
from the model.  Here too, coefficient  estimates for the remaining variables were virtually
identical to those reported here (results available on request).  Hence it appears that this
form of simultaneity does not exert a potent effect on the outcomes of most interest here,
namely the pension governance and authority terms.
An additional question examined  in some detail, but summarized here for the sake of
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brevity,  pertained  to the issue of biased reporting  due to selective  missing data.  This  was
handled  in two ways.  First, if a pension plan had valid data on all but one (or a  few) right
hand side  variables,  the missing datum was assigned  a value  of 0 and a missing-value
indicator was given a value of  1.  This permitted  maintenance  of sample size due to
incomplete  reporting  for pension assumptions,  in particular.  A second approach was taken
if the plan  lacked a report for a dependent variable,  since this raised a question about
whether  the data were  missing randomly.  Specifically,  it might be that that those plans  who
were performing  less well than the market, or those  who were more poorly funded than
average,  might  not be reporting.  For this reason,  several  models were  also estimated
accounting  for the probability  of some plans  not reporting  investment yields and funding
ratios.  In each case, a sample selection term  derived  from a Probit nonreport equation
(inverse  Mills ratio)  was incorporated in the regression  equations  (I  and 2).  The selection
controls proved  to be not statistically significant  in general,  andc6ther coefficient estimates
were quite  similar to those reported hele  (results  available  on request).
The conclusion  from the sensitivity analysis  is that the results  appearing in Tables  7 and 8
are quite  robust to a reasonable range of alternative  formulations.  They also confirm the
important  role of several pension governance  features in public pension  plan outcomes." 9
It must  be emphasized  that these behavioral patterns  are derived  from the data at hand,
however,  and are not necessarily  representative  of those plans  excluded  from the PENDAT
sample.  Specifically,  the findings  are most  applicable  to relatively  large state-run plans,
rather  than the smaller  local and municipal  public plans  covering  a few officers or other
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uniformed  public sector workers.  As a result,  the data are not yet good enough to  know
whether  these smaller plans have the same problems,  and same strengths, as their larger
counterparts.
V. Conclusions and Discussion
After a decade of strong growth, public pension  plans in the United States are
at a crossroads.  A few state and local retirement systems are in serious straights, having
earned large negative rates of return on assets, or in some cases having virtually no assets
by 1990. Already some retirees have confront cuts in benefits: in 1991, for example, the
California state legislature  disallowed two cost-of-living clauses in its public pension plan,
earmarking the funds thus generated to "reduce employer contributions  in fiscal year
1992-93 and subsequent  fiscal years until those amounts are depleted" (court documents
cited by Melbinger 1992:  23).  In the future, retirees may face more serious cuts, if fund
assets prove too meagre to meet benefit promises.
In contrast to these problems experienced in pension plans where employers
were subject to most fiscal distress,  many public plans have done quite well.  The strong
capital markets of the 1980's boosted many pension systems' investment  portfolios
substantially.  Increased assets combined with careful money management  and adequate
employer contributions  covered all or most of the benefits promised  to current and future
retirees. This research shows that better performance from public pensions was attained
when plans managed their funds and actuarial computations  professionally,  instead of
relying on former or current employees, and by eschewing investment  rules directing funds
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to in-state projects.
These conclusions  may not be popular with policymakers  confronting budgets
in distress.  Indeed a great deal of effort has recently been directed to developing new ways
of reducing public pension contributions, and where possible, directing pension  assets so as
to generate local jobs and investment. A critically important question which is only
beginiing  to be asked is whether the social costs of underfunding and below-market  return
investments are sufficient to offset their social benefits.  In other words from a public
finance viewpoint, "socially  targeted" infrastructure investments could be justified when the
social gains to such investment  outweigh the social costs, taking care to note that the costs
include potential retiree insecurity when public pension underfunding  leads to pension and
other benefit cuts. It would be useful to design and implement such a cost/benefit
framework when evaluating  public pension asset allocation and performance  practices.  In
order to do this, more timely data must be collected which can be examined  using a
common reporting and accounting framework.  Policymakers and researchers  in the United
States have begun to recognize this need, and have recommended  standardization  of pension
data gathering, probably under the aegis of a federal agency (Melbinger 1992;  Mitchell
1991; Munnell  1983).
Fiscal analysts in developing countries may profit from the mistakes and the
lessons gleaned from public pensions in the United States.  This paper shows that pension
systems are extremely complex  institutions, so that care must be taken when designing the
regulatory and investment  environment in which such plans operate. This study did not
Olivia S. Mitchell - Public Pension Governance and Performance31
seek to identify an optimal package of pension plan practices for all systems across all time
periods.  However, it did indicate that professional actuarial and investment counsellors
must be sought, rather than relying on employees to chose investment strategies which will
guarantee eventual benefit payments.  (There was no persuasive evidence that hiring a
money manager from the most active segment of the market would generate much better
portfolio performance). The research also suggested some of the enormously  complicated
issues that must be confronted when seeking to establish funding norms for defined benefit
pension plans in the public sector.  The Government Accounting Standards Board in the
U.S. has devoted several years to the development of a standardized framework  to be used
for reporting public pension plan liabilities and assets; their work would be beneficially
reviewed by those designing public pensions in developing countries. 20
In general, if full, or near full, funding of public pension plans is
contemplated, it would appear useful to require standardization  of pension reporting
practices.  This is particularly true regarding the myriad assumptions needed to cost out a
defined benefit plan's promised obligations, including the amortization  penod over which
past liabilities must be met.  This is often a difficult task, inasmuch as defined benefit
pension rules determining benefit eligibility and amounts frequently differ from one group
of employees to another, as well as across cohorts.  Sometimes benefit and contribution
regulations have internally inconsistent objectives.  Frequently in a developing country there
may be insufficient actuarial data to derive assumptions needed for projecting expected
labor force patterns, and forecasts of economic trends are also inherently uncertain. For all
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these reasons, it is a fairly laborious task to improve reporting and disclosure patterns for
public plans.  In many cases pension systems are not computerized,  making it even more
difficult to track investments and participant data. In other cases, there may be substantial
evasion of public pension payroll taxes, which can make projections of contribution flows
politically disputatious. 2'
This raises a more general concern: how should public pension policies in
developing courtries be evaluated? For example, mandatory retirement savings programs in
most are generally subject to numerous government restrictions -- about where the funds
can be be invested domestically and whether any can be invested abroad, about the fund's
exposure to inflation and financial market risk, and related questions. Those contemplating
mandating retirement savings programs must recognize that these restrictions are a means of
reallocating the risks of retirement income security between the public and private sectors,
which should be explicitly acknowledged in designing pension funding and investment
policy.  Whether the social costs of such programs offset their social benefits should be a
question explicitly asked, and at least partly answered.
A way to reframe this question is to ask why state and local public pensions
tend to be relatively fully funded, at least as compared to most OECD nations which have
employed PAY&GO  financing for some time.  One explanation may be that states and
localities are prevented from total underfunding because of their relatively mobile
populations, who recognize that underfunded plans will impose eventual tax burdens on
them.  While this is an attractive theory, there is little empirical support showing that
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underfunded pension promises are capitalized precisely in property values (Epple and
Shipper 1981). There is, however, some suggestion that public sector workers  demand a
wage premium to compensate  them for their underfunded pension promises (Smith 1981;
Mitchell and Smith 1992),  and other constraints resulting from underfunded  pensions might
be low bond ratings, for example. These constraints will probably become  increasingly
binding at the national level, with more flexible intemational labor and capital mobility, and
may begin to restrict national governments' ability to underfund public pension plans as
well.
Some analysts suggest that the myriad reporting and funding  issues
surrounding publicly managed pension plans can be dispensed with, if a defined
contribution plan is established, rather than a defined benefit plan.  In this latter case, the
employer promises only to deposit some contribution rate into an investment  account,
which then is invested, usually with the proviso that funds cannot be withdrawn  until
retirement.  In the United States, deferred compensation plans of this sort have become
increasingly popular since enabling tax law regarding these plans was clarified during the
1980's.  All  states currently offer such plans to their public sector employees,  generally in
the form of voluntary supplemental  tax-deferred savings plans offered in addition to the
conventional defined benefit pension plan.  A recent study indicated  participation  rates of
about 24% of eligible workers in the public sector.  These plans are even more popular
among private employees, where 57% of eligible employees participate  in 401(k) defined
contribution offerings. The difference in participation rates between public and private
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sectors is attributed to the fact that public employees must make the entire contribution
themselves and the limit is currently $7,500 per year, (or one-third of compensation)  while
in the private sector, the contribution  limit is higher and companies generally  offer workers
matching funds (EBRI 1993).
One appeal of these savings plans is that they are self-directed,  which means
participants can often tailor their own investment portfolios to their individual  preferences.
In recent years, however, analysts have become concerned that employees  participating  in
deferred pay plans tend to overconcentrate  their investment portfolios in low-risk,
low-return assets.  As a consequence  of their conservative stance, future retirees may find
that their retirement incorr. is inadequate to meet needs (EBRI 1993). This objection is
linked to a broader criticism  of these plans, which is that they do not necessarily generate
subsistence income for retirees, inasmuch as eventual benefit amounts are linked to
contributions, not need (James 1992).
The appeal of miandatory  defined contribution plans has been spurred by the
recent experiences of Chile's new retirement system.  A decade ago, several private
investment houses were awarded the management rights over workers' pension  plans
created as a replacement for the country's foundering PAYGO social security system.  The
Chilean system's popularity is in part due to the finding that the investment  returns under
this plan exceeded those of other public retirement systems in Latin America  (Mesa Lago
1989 and 1991).  While this is laudatory, little is yet known about how well the plans
performed relative to an internationally  diversified portfolio, which is in principle the
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standard which employees  and retirees might wish to use.  During the firht  several years of
the Chilean pension plan's operaticn, for instance, the pension system's investment portfolio
was limited almost exclusively to government bonds, and only gradually has private
domestic equity been permitted.  Even more recently, the Chilean  defined contribution
system has begun to introduce international asset holdings, though are still limited to a
fraction  of the pension portfolio. 22
In conclusion,  policymakers all over the world confront an aging population.
Better functioning pension  plan structures must be devised to meet the retirement needs of
older persons in both developed  and developing countries.  A key element in meeting these
needs will be the improvement  of pension plan investment and funding  performance.  The
U.S. experience cannot be generalized to other countries in every instance, but it does
demonstrate that public pension performance is responsive  to the financial and
admninistrative  environment  in which these plans operate.  Retirement  income security of
tomorrow requires designing  better pension systems today.
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Table i.
State and Local Pension Plan Characteristics
1. Public Pension Plan Characteristics  Through Time
Year
1980  1985  1989
Total Participants  NA  15,234  16,684
(000)
Active Participants  NA  10,364  11,357
(000)
Total Assets  $162  374  629
($B current)
Total Contributions  $21  37  44
($B current)
Total Benefits  $11  22  33
($B current)
Number of Plans  NA  2,589  2,387
Source: Piascentini  and  Foley (1992).
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II. Survey  of Public Pension  Plan  Participants  in 1989
Pension Feature
Mean Retirement Benefit'  $9,31°
Median Retirement Benefit'  $7,200
Median Public Pension as % of Pre-retirement Earnings (total) 2 42%
Median Public Pension as % of Pre-retirement
Earnings for those not receiving Social Security 3 50%
Fraction Receiving Any Post Retirement Benefit Increases'  34%
Fraction of Participants  Covered by Defined Benefit Plan 5 70%
Sources:
'Phillips (1992), Table 14.9, p. 367.
'Phillip' (1992), Table :4.13, p. 371.
'Phillips (1992), Table 14.7, p. 375.
4Phillips  (1992), Table 14.20, p. 379.
'Phillips (1992), Table 14.25,  p. 384.  Fraction excludes  more than 10% of respondents  unable to identify
their plan type.
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Table  2.
Size and  Allocation  of Pension  Plan  Portfolios:
1950-1989
Fraction  of Assets in:
Total  Assets  Corporate  Corporate  US G;ovt
($B Current)  Equities  Bonds  Securities
Other
I.  State  and  local government  plans
1950  $4.9  0.0%  12.2%  51.0%
36.7%
1955  10.8  1.9  25.0  43.5  29.6
1960  19.7  3.0  36.0  29.9  31.0
1965  34.1  7.3  50.4  22.3  19.9
1970  60.3  16.7  58.2  10.9  14.1
1975  104.8  23.2  59.0  7.4  10.4
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1980  198.1  22.4  47.7  20.2  9.7
1985  404.7  29.7  31.9  30.5  7.9
1989  727.4  39.9  27.3  27.2  5.5
II. Private plans
Noninsured:
1950  $7.1  15.5%  39.4%  32.4%
12.7%
1955  18.3  33.3  43.2  16.4  7.1
1960  38.1  43.3  41.2  7.1  8.4
1965  74.4  54.8  30.5  4.0  10.6
1970  112.0  59.9  26.2  2.7  11.2
1975  225.0  48.0  18.6  8.0  25.4
1980  469.6  47.6  16.5  10.8  25.1
1985  848.4  46.4  14.3  12.3  27.0
1989  1,163.5  57.3  12.4  12.3  18.0
Insured:
1950  4.8  4.2  41.7  22.9  31.2
1955  10.1  4.0  43.6  9.9  42.6
1960  16.8  4.8  43.5  6.0  45.8
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1965  25.5  6.3  41.6  3.5  48.6
1970  37.5  13.6  37.6  2.4  46.4
1975  64.6  18.6  37.5  2.2  41.8
1980  152.2  16.0  39.9  3.7  40.3
1985  337.9  13.0  35.7  12.9  38.4
1989  525.8  12.3  39.8  11.6  36.3
Note:  Insured plans are pension plans whose assets are held by insurance companies.
Source:  Hoffman and Mondejar  (1992), T. 16.9 and 10, pp. 438-441.
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Table  3.
Historic Pension  Plan  Investment  Yields
(1968-1986)
US State & Local  US Large  Private  Pension  Plan  Canadian  Large  US
Pension Plan  Investment  Return  Private  Pension Plan  Market Indeces  Inflation
Investment  Return'  SEI data 2 5500  data'  Investment  Return 4 Stocks'  Bonds'  Rate'
1968  7.75&  8.4%  - 9.4%  11.1%  2.6%  4.7%
1969  -7.94  -5.2  --  -3.2  -8.5  -8.1  6.1
1970  5.63  1.3  --  1.3  4.0  18.4  5.5
1971  14.76  17.5  --  12.5  14.3  11.0  3.4
1972  12.58  15.3  --  18.4  19.0  7.3  3.4
1973  -9.32  -15.1  - -2.1  -14.7  1.1  8.8
1974  -13.03  -20.3  --  -12.7  -26.5  -3.1  12.2
1975  19.14  23.1  --  13.2  37.2  14,6  7.0
1976  18.03  17.2  - 12.4  23.8  18.6  4.8
1977  0.31  -2.2  1.6  8.7  -7.2  1.7  6.8
1978  3.16  5.8  6.0  13.5  6.6  -0.1  9.0
1979  6.36  13.7  10.1  15.0  18.4  -4.2  13.3
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1980  11.58  20.2  21.9  18.3  32.4  -2.6  12.4
1981  3.00  2.7  5.4  1.5  -4.9  -1.0  8.9
1982  27.22  23.0  18.2  21.1  21.4  43.8  3.9
1983  12.89  15.9  9.4  20.0  22.5  4.7  3.8
1984  - --  9.9  8.8  6.3  16.4  4.0
1985  --  --  20.0  23.5  32.2  30.9  3.8
1986  --  --  14.1  12.8  18.5  19.8  1.1
Notes:
'Public  pension plan data from SEI Financial Services reported by Berkowitz  & Logue (1986), T. AIII-3.
2  Large U.S. private plan data from SEI Financial Services reported  by McCarthy  & Tumer (1992) T. 12.1, p.
253.
'Large  U.S. private plan data from 5500 Repo-ts reported by McCarthy  and Tumer (1992) T. 12.1, p. 253.
'Large  Canadian  private pension plan data from SEI Financial Services reported by Pesando  and Hyatt (1992)
T. 1, p. 21.
'McCarthy and Tumer (1992), Table 12.1, p. 253.
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Table  4.
Recent  Public  Sector  Pension  Plan  Yields:
Annual Averages, 1984-1990
State  & Local  Pension  Plan  Market  Indeces  Inflation
Investment  Return  Bonds'  Securities'  Rate'
Average 1984-1990:  11.13%  15.51%  13.91%
4.11%
1990  6.85'  -3.17  6.78  6.11
1988  3.95'  16.81  10.70  4.42
Average  1988-90  9.553  15.04  11.24  5.06
Average  1986-90  11.984  13.77  10.66  4.14
Average  1986-88  13.885  13.50  10.09  3.32
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Average  1984-88  12.076  15.79  15.51  3.54
Notes:
'Zom (1991), T. VII-7, p. 34; 129 plans.
2Zom (1990), T. 34, p. B34; 108  plans.
3Zom (1991),  T. VII-8, p.  35; 85 plans.
4Zom (1991),  T. VII-9, p. 36; 85 plans.
5Zom (1990), T. 35, p. B35; 113 plans.
6Zom  (1990),  T. 36, p.  B36; 85 plans.
7lbbotson Associates (1992), T. 13,  p. 34.
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Table 5.
Pension Plan Stock Funding Ratios in 1991
Ratio of Pension Plan Assets
to Pension Plan Liabilities  Fraction of Plans
I.  State and  Local  Plans'
< 50%  8%
50-74  21
75-99  39
3  100%  33
II.  Private  Sector Plans 2
< 50%  1%
50-74  4
75-99  10
100-124  25
125-149  22
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2! 150%  38
Sources:
'Author's adaptation  of unpublished data from GAO.
2EBRI (1992), Table 4.20, p. 153.
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Table  6.
Descriptive  Statistics  and  Variable Definitions
1.  Dependent  Variables  MeanSt.  Dev.
YR I  ROR  7.74  4.9
YR2ROR  11.58  2.9
RETURNSD  0.44  0.3
AST_PBO  0.91  0.3
FLOWFUND  0.93  0.5
II.  Explanatory  Var:ables
BDELAC  0.31  0.3
BDELRT  0.03  0.1
LIABINS  0.42  0.5
BDACTOK  0.83  0.4
BDBENOK  0.72  0.5
ADINVST  0.51  0.5
INVINHS  0.42  0.5
ACCINHS  0.61  0.5
TOPIOMG  0.41  0.5
TOPIO*EXT  0.18  0.4
PRUDMAN  0.85  0.4
INSTATE  0.01  0.1
STKMAX  0.83  0.4
INDINVPF  0.75  0.4
FREQVAL  1.23  0.8
REPSOLO  0.59  0.5
GIVERPT  0.90  0.3
AMORTPER  22.29  13.8
AMORTMS  0.10  0.3
ACTUARUC  0.10  0.3
COLA  0.77  0.4
WDOT  4.81  2.5
WDOTMS  0.19  0.4
PORTABLE  0.35  0.5
EXPROR  7.68  1.2
EXPRORMS  0.01  0.1
INFL  3.53  2.5
INFLMISS  0.32  0.5
AVRETAGE  46.80  24.4
AVRETAGEMS  0.21  0.4
SSINT  0.12  0.3
FLJNDLAW  0.58  0.5
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DEFPOS  0.40  0.5
TCHRPLAN  0.12  0.3
ASSETS  (*10-3)  496.44  7.0
ASSETSSQ  (* 10-9)  0.05  0.2
BOND  33.16  28.1
STOCK  36.09  17.3
BENNOCUT  0.52  0.5
BENTIERS  0.28  0.5
ISUNION  0.67  0.5
SPECTAX  0.15  0.4
UNEMPD90  -1.73  1.2
(continued)
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Table  6 (continued)
Variable  Definitions
Note:  All variables are derived from the PENDAT file described in Zorn (1991) unless
otherwise indicated. All variables are qualitative (0,1) unless speci;ied.
Dependent  Variables
YRIROR  Annual rate of retmun  reported in 1991  survey (%).
YR5ROR:  Average annualized rate of return 1986-90  reported in 1991 survey (%).
RETURNSD:  Return Variability (%) = (([1990 Return - (1986-90 Average Return)J*2)*l/2)  /
(1986-90 Average Retum)
AST_PBO:  Ratio of reported pension system assets to PBO rr.asure of cumulative  plan
liabilities (%).
FLOWFUND:  Ratio or annual actual to required employer  plan contributions (%).
Independent Variables
A. Pension Board Composition
BDELAC:  Fraction of pension Board elected by active employees  (%).
BDELRT:  Fraction  of pension Board elected by retired employees  (%).
BDBENOK:  Board is required to authorize benefit  amounts.
BDACTOK:  Board is required to authorize acruarial  assumptions.
LIABINS:  Board is covered by liability insurance.
B. Pension  Management Practices
ADINVST:  Administrative  cost charged to pension investment  income.
INVINHS:  Investment staff of pension portfolio is partly (or fully) managed in-house.
ACCINHS:  Accounting staff needs of pension system partly (or fully) met in-house.
TOPIOMG:  Plan investments  are handled partly (or fully) by external money managers in the
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top 10 performance  bracket as per Laknonishok et al. (1992).
TOPIO*EXT:  Plan investments  exclusively handled by ton 10 money managers.
C. Pension  Investment  Practices
PRUDMAN:  Pension Board required to act according to "prudent man" rule.
INSTATE:  Fraction  of pension investments  which must be directed in-stae (%).
STKMAX:  There is a maximum limitation on the assets in the pension portfolio.
D. Pension  Reporting  Practices
INDINVPF:  Pension  system obtains independent investment performance  evaluafiors.
FREQVAL:  Frequency  of independent  performance evaluations.
REPSOLO:  System issues own financial report (not integrated with other budgets).
GIVERPT:  Plan participants  receive annual financial report.
AMORTPER:  Amortization  period for past service liabilities.
AMORTMS:  Amortization  period not stated.
ACTUARUC:Pension  system uses unit credit method of computing pension liabilities.
E. Pension  Assumptions
COLA:  Benefits  are partially (or fully) indexed after retirement.
WDOT:  Future salary growth assumption required to compute PBO.
WDOTMS:  Salary growth assumption not stated.
PORTABLE:  Employees  moving within state may carry benefit accruals to new plans.
NEXPROR:  Interest  rate assumption used in computing PBO  (%).
EXPRORMS:  Interest  rate assumption not stated.
INFL:  Cost of living assumption required to compute PBO.
INFLMS:  Cost of living assumption not stated.
AVRETAGE:  Average retirement age used in computing PBO (yrs).
AVRETAGEMS:  Average  retirement age not stated.
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SSINT:  Plan is integrated with Social Security.
F. Other Factors
FUNDLAW:  State has legal funding standard for pension system.
DEFPOS:  State law does not prohibit carryover of state budget deficit from one year to the
next (National Association  of State Budget Officers 1992)
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Table  6 (continued)
TCHRPLAN:  System covers at least some teachers and other school employees.
PTCHR:  Plan exclusively covers teachers and other school employees.
ASSETS:  Actuarial  value of pension system assets, typically  (though not always) reported at
market value (million S).
ASSETSQ:  Squared value of ASSETS.
BOND:  Fraction  of pension system portfolio held in corporate  and government  bonds (%).
STOCK:  Fraction  of pension system portfolio held in stock (%).
BENNOCUT:  State has law guaranteeing benefit amounts.
BENTIERS:  Benefits  differ according to worker hire date (usually more recent hires receive
somewhat  lower benefits).
SPECTAX:  A special  or dedicated tax is the source of employer  contributions.
ISUNION:  A: least some of the employees covered by the pension system are unionized.
U'NEMPD:  Recent  (1990) level of unemployment minus the long run (1981-89) average level of
unemployment  level in the state (US Bureau  cf the Census 1991).
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Table  7.
Determinants  of Investment  Returns
in State and  Local  Pension  Plans
(standard  errors  in parentheses)
Dependent  Variable
YRlROR  YRSROR  RETURNSD
Explanatory  Variable  1990 Return  1986-90 Return  Retum Variability  1986-90
A.  Pension  Board Composition
BDELAC  -0.71  -1.65  0.12
(1.76)  (1.20)  (0.14)
BDELRT  -17.08"  -0.23  0.96'
(7.14)  (4.68)  (0.53)
B.  Pension  Management Practices
ADINVST  -0.34  -1.23"  0.01
(0.89)  (0.58)  (0.07)
RNVINHS  0.80  0.60  -0.04
(1.36)  (0.92)  (0.16)
TOP1OMG  -0.49  -0.32  0.07
(1.3 1)  (0.86)  (0.  1  0)
TOP10*EXT  -0.08  -0.33  0.13
(1.31)  (0.86)  (0.13)
C.  Pension  Investment Practices
PRUDMAN  0.83  0.33  -0.001
(1.20)  (0.84)  (0.10)
INSTATE  -7.74'  -1.63  0.46
(4.09)  (2.45)  (0.28)
STK.MAX  -0.03  0.57  0.004
(1.18)  (0.86)  (0. 1  0)
D.  Pension  Reporting Practices
:NDINVPF  -1.16  -0.57  0.12
(1.00)  (0.68)  (0.08)
FREQVAL  0.70  0.13  -0.07
(0.54)  (0.55)  (0.06)
E.  Other Factors
TCHRPLAN  -1.27  -0.32  -0.01
(1.28)  (0.86)  (0.10)
ASSETS  -0.31  0.001  0.001
(*10-3)  (0.165)  (0. I 1)  (0.0 1)
ASSETSQ  2.30  0.82  -0.07
(*I 0-9)  (4.86)  (3.08)  (0.40)
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BOND  0.02  0.03"  -0.001(0.02)
(0.01)  (0.001)
STOCK  0.03  0.03  -0.001
(0.03)  (0.02)  (0.002)
Constant  6.56'  9.88-  0.44"
(2.27)  (1.88)  (.21)
R 2 11.3  12.4  13.6
N  158  132  132
Notes:  *t  k  1.96, *t 2  1.65 (< 1.96).
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Table  8.
Determinants  of Stock and  Flow Funding
in State and  Local Pension Plans
(standard errors in parentheses)
Dependent  Variable
Explanatory  Variable  AST_PBO  Flow Fund
A.  Pension  Board Composition
BDELAC  -0.20"  0.08
(0.08)  (0.17)
BDELRT  -0.61'  0.27
(0.35)  (0.72)
B.  Pension  Management Practices
BDBENOK  -0.01  -0.01
(0.06)  (0.1  1)
BDACTOK  0.13'  0.30"
(0.07)  (0.15)
LIABINS  0.13"  -0.19"
(0.05)  (0.09)
ACCINHS  0. !  1  -0.02
(0.05)  (0.09)
C.  Pension  Reporting Practices
REPSOLO  0.05  -0.01
(0.05)  (0.09)
GIVERPT  0.09  0.003
(0.08)  (0.15)
AMORTPER  -0.001''  -0.002
(0.01)  (0.004)
AMORTMS  -0.31  -0.34"
(0.09)  (0.16)
ACTUARUC  0.03  -0.13
(0.08)  (0.17)
D.  Pension  Assumptions
COLA  -0.03  0.10
(0.06)  (0. 1)
WDOT  -0.04  0.02
(0.04)  (0.07)
WDOTMS  -0.35  0.08
(0.24)  (0.44)
PORTABLE  -0.13'  0.02
(0.05)  (0.  0)
NEXPROR  -0.01  0.02
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(0.04)  (0.04)
EXPRORMS  0.12  0.77
(0.33)  (0.77)
INFL  -0.03  0.05
(0.03)  (0.06)
INFLMS  -0.21  0.28
(0.18)  (0.34)
AVRETAGE  -0.0003  0.001
(0.01)  (0.01)
AVRETAGMS  0.08  -0.18
(0.31)  (0.57)
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Table  8 (continued)
Dependent  Variable
Explanatory  Variable  AST_PBO  Flow Fund
SSINT  0.02  0.16
(0.07)  (0.16)
E.  Other Factors
FUNDLAW  0.001  -0.07
(0.05)  (0.10)
BENNOCUT  0.03  -0.10
(0.05)  (0.09)
BENTIERS  -0.03  0.03
(0.05)  (0.10)
DEFPOS  0.08  -0.003
(0.05)  (0.10)
SPECTAX  0.04  -0.01
(0.06)  (0.13)
TCHRPLAN  -0.04  -0.02
(0.07)  (0.12)
ISUNION  0.07  -0.13
(0.05)  (0.10)
UNEMPD  -0.06'  0.002
(0.02)  (0.04)
Constant  1.33"  0.44
(0.45)  (0.84)
R 2 29.0  19.0
N  217  184
Notes:  "t  2  1.96, 't a  1.65 (< 1.96)
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Appendix  Table.
Total  Administrative  Costs as a Percent  of Pension Plan Assets
by Asset  Size Class
Entire  No External  With Extemal
Samnple  (N)  Managers (N)  Managers  (N)
Asset  Size Class ($Million)
<  100  4.52%  (40)  18.50 ( 6)  2.05 (34)
2100  to <1,000  1.08% (50)  0.36 (12)  1.30 (38)
Ž1,000 to  <10,000  0.33%  (48)  0.49 (17)  0.25 (31)
210,000  0.10%  (20)  0.06 ( 4)  0.12 (16)
Source: Computed from  PENDAT  data file.
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Endnotes
i.l.Excluded  from  the PERS  designation  are national  military  and federal
government  employee  plans,  as  well  as  federal  Social  Security  old-age  pensions.
These  plans  are,  for  the  most  part,  unfunded  systems.
2.2.For  a  discussion  of  studies  on  this  topic  see  Beebower  and  Bergstrom  (1977);
Berkowitz  et al (1986):  Brinson  et al. (1986):  Grinblatt  and  Titman  (1989):
McCarthy  and  Turner  (1992);  and  Ippolito  (1984).
3.3.See the Appendix  Table  for  a summary  of administrative  costs  in public
pension  plans.
4.4.This has  been  called  "window-dressing"  at  year  end  so  as  not  to be seen
holding  "losers"  (Benartzi  and  Thaler  1992).
5.5.In  the  United  States,  the  Employee  Retirement  Income  Security  Act  of 1974
(ERISA)  requires  private  sector  pension  plan  assets  to  be  managed  according  to
prudent  and conservative  investment  practice,  and  furthermore  holds  plan
trustees  personally  responsible  for  the  plan's  investment  practices.  However
ERISA does  not  cover  PERS  plans,  and  efforts  to  extend  national  regulation  to
state  and  local  pensions have been challenged  by  those who believe  that  this
would  undermine  states'  taxing  authority.  See  Munnell  (1983).
6.6.Cessation  of benefits  has become less likely  since  ERISA  regulations
established  a government  insurance  agency  for  private  sector  defined  benefit
private  pensions.  On the  other  hand  the  pension  insurance  agency  is  not
completely  stable  financially,  and  the risk  of  private  pension  underfunding  is
now  borne  primarily  by  groups  other  than  those  retirees  in  the  underfunded  plan;
see  Gus  man  and  Mitchell  (1992).
7.7.The  PBO  includes  five  types  of  prospective  pension  liabilities  as  noted  in
Mitchell  and  Smith  (1992b):  benefits  pledged  to currently  retired  employees.
benefits  pledged  to  vested  terminated  employees  (based  on  past  service  and  salary
levels),  benefits  payable  to  vested  active  employees  (based on  current  service
and  salary),  benefits  payable  to  non-vested  active  employees  who  may  vest  in  the
future,  and  benefits  that  will  be  earned  by  current  workers  resulting  from  future
salary  increases.  The  plan's  PBO changes  over  time  reflecting  new  expected
benefit  accruals;  these  yearly  accruals  are  termed  the  plan's  "normal  cost."  To
be  actuarially  sound,  the  employer's  annual  contributions  to  the  plan  must  be
meet  normal  cost  and  to  amortize  any  past  unfunded  pension  liabilities.
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8.s.Statement  based  on  author's  computations  using  PENDAT  1991  data  and  personal
communication  with  plan  representative.
9.9.For  a discussion  of recent  efforts  by nunierous  public  employers  to cut
public  pension  funding  see  Durgin  (1991).  Employee Benefit  Plan Review (1991),
Hemmerik  (1991  a  and  b),  Price  (1991).  Shine (1991).  and  Verhovek  (1990).
lo.io.When  there  were  missing  data,  this  was  handled  in  several  ways. Serious
reporting  errors  in pension  statistics  were rechecked  with the PERS plan
representatives  directly.  A complete  list  of data  checks  thus  generated  is
available  from  the  author  on  request.  For  example  the  stock  funding  ratio  for
Wisconsin  was listed  in  the dataset  as 1300%.  which  the  plan  representative
indicated  was  incorrect. In  the  case  of  missing  observations  for  some  of  the
explanatory  variables  used  in  regression  models,  the  variable  in  question  was
assigned  a  value  of  0,  and  concurrently  the  missing  value  dummy  variable  was  set
to  1.  Missing  data  on  the  dependent  variable  (e.g.  investment  performance  or
funding)  suggested  the use of sample  selection  models  to determine  whether
systems  which  did  report  their  funding  and investment  yields  had  better  (or
worse)  than  average  outcomes;  see  Section  IV.
ii.ii.If there  is a link between  state  balanced  budget  laws  and pension
funding,  it  probably  arises  when state  pension  contributions  are  allowed  to
fluctuate  depending  on  state  budget  needs,  affording  politicians  on  off-budget
method  of achieving  compliance  with  balanced  budget  requirements. This  can
happen  since  most  state  budgets  typically  do  not  include  public  pension  systems
in  their  regular  budget  reports.  It  is  has  not  yet  been  determined  whether  the
safety-valve  argument  is empirically  important. Certainly  balanced  budget
mandates  are  widespread:  a  majority  of  states  (44)  have  balanced  budget  laws  on
the  books,  and  most  of  these  (37)  require  the  governor  to  sign  a  balanced  budget
(NASBO  1992).  Only  13  states  permit  the  governor  to  carry  over  a  budget  deficit
from  one  year  to  the  next,  providing  flexibility  which  might  obviate  the  need  to
use  the  public  pension.  This  latter  stance  is  deemed  "most  stringent"  by  NASBO,
is  represented  in  the  DEFPOS  variable  developed  for  this  study.
12.12.This  one-year  yield  is  somewhat  higher  than  the  6.85%  reported  in  Zorn
(1991)  who  also  used  the  PENDAT  file. His  sample  is  smaller  since  he  excluded
39  plans  but  offers  no  rationale  for  their  exclusion.
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13.13.This  5-year  annualized  yield is lower  than the 13.88%  rate  reported  in
Zorn (1991)  who also used the PENDAT file.  His study is smaller since he
excluded  53 plans  but  offers  no rationale  for  their  exclusion.
14.14.For  example,  President  Clinton proposed  using  pension  funds  to create
infrastructure  in  his  1992  campaign.
15.1s.Zorn  (1991)  reports  a slightly  lower  stock  funding  ratio  (89%)  but  uses
a much smaller  sample  size (30  plans)  from  the PENDAT  survey.
16.16.The  large  negative  funding figure was reported  by the New York State
Teachers' Retirement  Plan, where a change in the actuarial  method employed
explains  the  negative  contribution. A court  case is  pending  on  the  legality  of
this change.
17.17.It  should  be noted  that fund trustees  appointed  by politicians  may not
necessarily  ensure  that the plan is operated  for  the sole  benefit  of the plan
participant.  For  example,  the  California  public  employee  retirement  system  sued
the  Governor  of  that  state  for  proposing  to replace  the  13-member  pension  board
with a  newly  appointed  9-member  board,  as well  as appointing  the  plan's  actuary
who agreed  to the  Governor's  actuarial  assumptions  (Melbinger  1992).
s8.s8.Thus  these  data  do  not  support  Munnell  and  Ernsberger's  (1989)  suggestion
that commingling  pension  funding  with other government  budgets  may exacerbate
funding  problems. Those  authors  also suggested  that  more  centralization  might
improve  funding,  but this hypothesis is difficult  to test in practice  since
centralization  can  refer  to  many  different  aspects  of  plan  management.  Thus,  for
example, the  actuarial assessment may  be conducted centrally even though
contributions  are  collected  locally,  the benefits  administration  may  be managed
centrally  even though  negotiation  over benefits is conducted  locally,  and so
forth.
i  .a9.Several other  models  were also  examined,  including  one  which  entered  the
state  budget  deficit  variable  into  the returns  equations.  . The  coefficient  was
not statistically  significant  and all  other results  were unchanged.  Also
examined  were  models  where  the  TOP1MGR  term  was replaced  with  a  term indicating
whether  any  external  money  manager  was used,  and results  were unchanged.
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20.20.A  checklist  of issues  for  consideration  appears  in Mitchell  (1993
forthcoming).
21.21.Mitchell  (1993  forthcoming)  cites  examples  of  data  and  tax  collection
problems  in  developing  countries.
22.22.For  discussions  of  the  Chilean  experience  see  Baeza  (1986),  Baeza  and
Manubens  (1988),  Cheyre  (1991),  Diamond  (1992).  Marcel  and  Arenas  (1992),  Myers (1985),  and  Wallich  (1993).
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